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DISCUSSION OF PAPERS ON CYCLICALITY 
IN MORTGAGE MARKETS 
EDWARD J. KANE* 
Abstract: The mortgage market can be portrayed as a complicated machine 
that processes information and disinformation to help lenders and would-be 
homeowners to fashion an enforceable and fair set of mutual obligations. The 
papers in this symposium issue focus on ameliorating cyclical speed-ups and 
slowdowns in the lender-operated parts of this machine. My discussion focus-
es on two issues: (1) how transitioning to a gig economy is changing house-
hold needs for owner-occupied and rental homes across different age groups; 
and (2) how to use the legal system to lessen the informational disadvantage 
that would-be homeowners face in understanding the deals they are offered. 
INTRODUCTION 
U.S. mortgage markets can be likened to a gigantic machine with 
many real and financial “moving pieces.” These pieces move cyclically and 
are too many to be covered in a few papers. Table 1 lays out my understand-
ing of the main parts of this machine and sorts out which of these parts have 
and have not been specifically addressed so far in this session. 
I. LAURIE GOODMAN’S PAPER: COMPLICATIONS IN THE LENDING PROCESS 
Among the things that make mortgage markets different from other fi-
nancial markets are the ways borrower information is assembled, verified, 
and used. Lenders burned by bad information during the housing bubble 
need to rethink how they generate, double-check, and use measures of 
household creditworthiness. 
Laurie Goodman (Goodman 2017, 239–43, 247–49) produces evi-
dence of a post-crisis slowdown in resetting three parts on the supply side 
of the machine: 
1. Lending standards, especially FICO scores: Realtors and lend-
ers are learning more and more about how to inflate scores artifi-
cially, so that threshold scores must move up as well, if only to 
compensate for this bias. 
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2. Regulator and investor resistance to nontraditional mortgage 
contracts: This reinforces lenders’ difficulty in laying off mort-
gages which reflect low FICO scores. 
3. Servicing costs for Federal Housing Administration (FHA) 
loans. 
To complement her presentation, I want to call attention to parallel slow-
downs occurring on the household demand side of the machine. My main 
point is to note that homeownership has become more than ever an obstacle 
to job mobility and to relocation on retirement. Relatedly, the career econ-
omy and gig economy differ in ways that affect the age and ownership 
structure of household demand for mortgage credit: 
1. In the career economy, employees had to provide evidence of 
their loyalty to the employer. In part, owning a home bonded an 
employee’s loyalty to his or her employer and community. Em-
ployers responded in ways that encouraged or discouraged partic-
ular employees to move up or out. 
2. In the gig economy, it makes much more sense to rent, espe-
cially at the beginning of one’s career. If an employer wants high-
value employees to show loyalty to their firm, the employer will 
selectively bond the career options it has to offer and make sure 
that benefits improve progressively with length of service. 
In my opinion, the changing role of loyalty in employer-employee re-
lations is fueling extra-long delays in reworking and restoring major pieces 
of housing and mortgage demand today. These delays include: 
1. Delays in launching the careers, family sizes, and mortgage 
debt of unemployed and underemployed young people: Increas-
ingly dismal career prospects for those without at least some col-
lege education raised the percentage of 18- to 34-year-olds living 
at home in 2014 to 32%. (Fry 2016, 4–5). 
2. Delays in launching moves to warmer climates by would-be-
empty-nesters who are still housing adult children or in neighbor-
hoods hurt badly by the crash. 
3. Delays in turning over homes and temporarily lower prices in 
warm-weather states for homeowners planning to move into as-
sisted-living facilities. 
4. Delays in launching new ways for Congress to deliver mort-
gage-related subsidies to lenders, builders, realtors, and landlords. 
The shape of reform of the government-sponsored enterprises 
(GSEs) remains unknowable, while post-crisis investment in a 
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common GSE securitization platform is going to make it all the 
harder to replace the GSEs with something entirely new. 
II. MCCOY-WACHTER PAPERS: HOW TO AMELIORATE  
CYCLICALITY IN TRUST 
The McCoy-Wachter papers (McCoy & Wachter 2017a; McCoy & 
Wachter 2017b, 377–78) pay special attention to the difficulty of relying on 
representations and warranties in the distrustful environment the housing 
crash has produced. Trust is always in short supply and adverse information 
is hard to surface. These authors explain why trust is particularly lacking 
today. Their work carefully documents the way that attempts to substitute 
assurances for due diligence expand and deteriorate in quality as a boom 
goes on. 
The exercise of pre-deal and post-deal due diligence goes through a 
cycle that parallels the boom and bust of housing and mortgage cycles, but 
in reverse. The loss of trust created by the overexpansion and deterioration 
of shortcuts for diligence in the boom makes lenders and borrowers in the 
ensuing bust and recovery more skeptical than they need to be. 
III. DIFFERENT WAYS OF RESTORING TRUST 
Representations and warranties are not the only class of due-diligence 
substitutes. Third-party guarantees and opinions about collateral values, 
credit ratings, and audited accounts show the same kind of overexpansion 
and deterioration in quality during real-estate bubbles. 
Following in the tradition of the literature on financial regulation, 
McCoy and Wachter study the problem of restoring trust in due-diligence 
substitutes as a two-party contracting problem. They propose to build a bet-
ter contract paradigm by making improvements in the dimensions of bilat-
eral negotiating space. To do this, they recommend imposing enhanced su-
pervisory safeguards against over-lending and introducing specific changes 
in the language of standard contracts. These improvements would expand 
the civil remedies and rights of redress available to the party buying opin-
ions and bond more effectively the duties of professionals who supply reps 
and warranties. 
But adverse societal losses from fraud can also be reduced by rewriting 
the laws of fraud as they apply to professional financiers. In my opinion, the 
burden of proof currently set for complainants by U.S. financial fraud law is 
so severe that it invites mortgage professionals to lie. 
Let me remind you of the five cumulative common-law tests for fraud 
(Bear and Maldonado-Bear 1994, 173–174): 
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1. A conscious misrepresentation or concealment of the truth; 
2. An intent to benefit by causing another party to rely on the un-
truth to his or her detriment; 
3. The misrepresentation was material (i.e., directly related to the 
harm caused); 
4. There was an intent to cause the other party to rely on the mis-
representation to his or her detriment; 
5. That the other party did reasonably believe, rely, and suffer 
provable harm. 
With respect to the exchange of expert opinion in financial activities, it 
would be useful to rewrite the laws of criminal fraud to weaken either or 
both of its demands for proving intent. I believe that the mortgage securiti-
zation bubble demonstrates that society has a special stake in exchanges of 
information. Collecting fees from customers based on willfully or negli-
gently unfulfilled promises of competence, loyalty, and careful work is a 
form of theft: a scam. Particularly in the gig sector of the knowledge econ-
omy, society needs to disincentivize knowingly destructive material misrep-
resentations by high-paid credentialed professionals. This can be done by 
replacing the traditional intent tests in the common-law definition of civil 
and criminal fraud by presumption of knowledge tests. When persons sup-
plying falsified information are acting in a professional capacity and paid 
handsomely for their opinion, it should be enough for complainants and 
prosecutors to establish that defendants “knew or should have known” the 
adverse consequences to which they were exposing their customers and so-
ciety at large. 
I believe both that burden of proof in prosecuting violations of trust is 
too tough and that the punishments that are generally meted out are too light 
for these laws to have much of a deterrent effect. Demands for proof and 
available punishments should be in inverse proportion to the damage done 
to families and society at large. Our prisons today hold numerous individu-
als who are said to harm society by buying, selling, or possessing forbidden 
drugs. The task of proving these allegations is made particularly easy by the 
existence of bright-line tests for establishing the occurrence of these crimes. 
In view of the far greater damage done by actions that contribute to fi-
nancial crises, it is fair to ask why the prosecutorial bar does not rebel 
against financial fraud and negligent-misrepresentation laws that are plainly 
overly hard to prosecute. My answer is that these are crimes that are com-
mitted by society’s elites and the elites and the politically well-connected 
have rigged the system against the rest of us. 
Unlike say, drug laws, these laws are written to protect high-status of-
fenders from exposure to harsh punishment. These offenders are allowed to 
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arm themselves with the best lawyers in the business. These lawyers are 
encouraged to paint their clients as “good people who have done one bad 
thing,” albeit repeatedly. Finally, the career ladder for regulators and prose-
cutors may foster a counterproductive fear of reprisals for challenging a 
high-status defendant’s case too aggressively. Strengthening their obligation 
and ability to enforce the nation’s antifraud law would send a message that 
would ease that fear of reprisals. 
Replacing each of the intent tests in financial fraud laws with a 
knowledge test would create a much stronger disincentive to exploiting cli-
ents, creditors, and taxpayer guarantees and undermine the extent of the 
impunity conveyed by golden parachutes and corporate settlements that do 
not document or admit wrongdoing. 
Giving hell-or-high-water pension rights to top executives cements the 
implicit conspiracy between megabank stockholders and managers to take 
undue advantage of others. It is not healthy for society to allow executives 
whose passion for exploitive short-term profits led them into forms of deal-
making that unduly risked the survival of their firm to mischaracterize and 
deny their bad behavior by settling complaints against them with corporate 
monies and retire with an unencumbered stream of handsome future in-
come. 
CONCLUSION 
Lenders move in and out of the nation’s mortgage markets every day. 
But households do so only several times in a lifetime. This leaves the aver-
age borrower at a severe disadvantage in understanding the disinformation 
buried in the deal conveyed by the daunting pile of papers they find them-
selves asked to sign. This makes trusting borrowers a boon to fraudsters and 
a danger both to themselves and to society at large. To my mind, the best 
substitute for enhanced borrower due diligence is to frame and enforce an 
easier-to-prosecute set of lender fraud laws. 
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Table 1. Taxonomy of Cyclically Moving Parts in U.S. Mortgage Markets 
1. Population Structure: Locational distribution* and differences 
in cultural norms in different age* and ethnic subpopulations 
2. Labor Markets: 
 a. Mismatch in locations of unfilled jobs and housing vacan-
cies* 
 b. Establishment of career prospects vs. gig-by-gig contracting* 
3. Adaptability of existing housing stock to shifts in demand for 
apartments, starter houses, upgrades, and retirement facilities* 
4. Cycle in the Flow of New Homes: gestation lags cause over-
building due to prices rising above production costs in booms and 
leave us with excess supply and fire-sale pricing in busts 
5. Cycle in the degree of due faith and due diligence embodied in 
lending standards 
 a. Impact of contract law and regulations on the enforceability 
of contracts 
 b. Impact of professional culture and criminal law* 
6. Political influence on: 
 a. The size of explicit and implicit subsidies flowing to owners, 
builders, realtors, and financial institutions 
 b. The character and enforceability of fraud laws† 
 c. The character of mortgage terms and protections 
 
 
 
 
* Not explicitly explored in the presentations under discussion 
† Only lightly touched upon in these presentations 
 
  
 
